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In a recent issue of this journal I proposed a rereading of Foucault as a Kantian critical 
philosopher.  In the pages of the present issue of the journal, Colin McQuillan offers a chal-
lenge to my reading by taking express issue with my claim that Foucault can be productively 
read as a Kantian.  To summarize the context for both McQuillan’s reply and the present re-
sponse, it will be useful to point out that the primary aim of my article was to dispute the 
recent trend in Foucault scholarship according to which archaeology and genealogy are best 
seen as efforts in phenomenological philosophy, stemming from various phenomenologists 
ranging from Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Jean Cavaillès.1 The occasion for my 
discussion was provided by an important recent article by Kevin Thomspon in which he 
proposes reading Foucault through a minority tradition of phenomenology, referred to by 
Thompson as a ‚phenomenology of the concept‛ or ‚realistic phenomenology‛ and located 
primarily in Cavaillès, Bachelard, and Canguilhem.2  My article was published with an in-
sightful reply by Thompson, in which he challenged my discussion of certain limitations that I 
located in the Foucault-as-phenomenologist literature.3  In my further response to Thompson’s 
reply, I took up his textual and philosophical challenge to my article, but only briefly dis-
cussed the background historiographical and metaphilosophical difficulties lingering behind 
our discussions.4 
                                                 
1 Cf., Colin Koopman, ‚Historical Critique or Transcendental Critique in Foucault: Two Kantian Lineages,‛ 
Foucault Studies, no. 8 (2010), 100-121. 
2 Cf., Kevin Thompson, ‚Historicity and Transcendentality: Foucault, Cavaillès, and the Phenomenology of 
the Concept,‛ History and Theory, 47 (February 2008), 1-18.  Other work in the Foucault-as-phenomenologist 
vein includes Béatrice Han, Foucault’s Critical Project: Between the Transcendental and the Historical, translated 
by Edward Pile (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998, 2002), and Andrew Cutrofello, Discipline and 
Critique: Kant, Post-structuralism, and the Problem of Resistance (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1994).  References 
throughout contain, in some instances, two dates: in such cases the first date refers to the original year of 
publication in the original language and the second date refers to the year of publication of the translation 
and edition to which the page number citation refers. 
3 Cf., Kevin Thompson, ‚Response to Colin Koopman’s ‘Historical Critique or Transcendental Critique in 
Foucault: Two Kantian Lineages,’‛ Foucault Studies, no. 8 (2010), 122-128. 
4 Cf., Colin Koopman, ‚Historical Conditions or Transcendental Conditions: Response to Kevin Thompson’s 
Response,‛ Foucault Studies, no. 8 (2010), 129-135. 




McQuillan’s reply takes a different focus than Thompson’s by offering a challenge to a 
second aspect of my article, in which I put forward the outlines of a reading of Foucault as a 
non-phenomenological Kantian.  McQuillan’s challenge is most welcome given that my ori-
ginal article was an attempt to negatively clear the ground of ‚the phenomenological 
Foucault‛ in order to make room for a positive elaboration of ‚a historical-critical Foucault‛ 
that takes his lead from a different appropriation of the work of Kant.  I develop this positive 
reinterpretation of Foucault as a Kantian in the larger project from which my article took its 
lead (that larger project is, in short, a book-length manuscript on genealogy primarily focused 
on the work of Foucault).  The present occasion of McQuillan’s argument is, therefore, most 
welcome insofar as replying to him compels me to sharpen many of the points of my 
discussion germane to that larger project.  I should like to take the occasion of this reply to of-
fer some thoughts on those background considerations which I only pointed toward, but did 
not fully develop, in my response to Thompson.  These considerations concern how we should 
approach the problem of appropriation in the history of philosophy and in the history of 
thought more generally.  These considerations set the stage for my fuller argument that Fou-
cault can be read as a Kantian (but since these greatly exceed the scope of a reply piece they 
will for the most part have to wait until the publication of the manuscript). 
I shall be describing the disagreement between McQuillan and myself by way of a 
distinction between two genres of the historiography of philosophy.  McQuillan appears eager 
to preserve a purified image of certain textual figures in the history of philosophy which 
would retain their original thought in the aura of a profundity.  His permissionist historiography 
demands that we work with our history by way of asking it for permission whenever we want 
to deploy its insights.  By contrast, my approach to the history of philosophy is oriented by an 
interest in the way in which the philosophy of the present breathes fresh life into its pasts and 
futures by means of the reuse, remix, and repropriation of canonical concepts, authors, and 
oeuvres.  My appropriationist historiography relies on an implicit demand that we creatively re-
make, rework, and remix our historical past for the purposes of the present.  I use the term 
‘appropriation’ advisedly, and by it I do not mean to suggest that opportunism and piracy 
should abound in the history of philosophy, but rather that creatively absorbing the insights of 
historical figures into one’s work is exactly how philosophy works well.  These represent two 
radically different ways of approaching the history of philosophy and our conceptual cultural 
inheritance.  Both have their advantages and their disadvantages.  I do not expect to, in the 
short space of a reply, definitively settle the argument on behalf of my approach to the history 
of philosophy.  But I shall be able to say a few things, perhaps of interest to readers of this 
journal, about what an appropriationist historiography can achieve that a permissionist 
historiography will too often fail at.5 
                                                 
5 These two labels are offered in loose reference to Lessig’s distinction between ‚remix culture‛ and ‚permis-
sion culture‛ in Lawrence Lessig, Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid Economy (New York: 
Penguin Press, 2008).  The competing approaches to the history of philosophy I here discuss point to a much 
broader and particularly pregnant issue in contemporary culture concerning the way in which we make use 
of our cultural inheritance.  Lessig discusses this from the legal-technological point of view of the problems 
raised for extant ways of dealing intellectual property by the digitization and internetization of our media 
environments. 
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I. Transcendental Philosophy 
McQuillan’s challenge focuses on two themes central to any reading of Kantian philosophy, of 
phenomenological philosophy, and of Foucault’s relation to these two traditions.  These 
concern, first, the project of ‚transcendental critique‛ as elaborated by Kant (later taken up by 
the phenomenologists), and second, the project of ‚philosophical critique‛ which I regard as a 
genus of which ‘transcendental critique’ is one species.  Let me begin with transcendental 
critique before going on in the next section to consider the idea (about which McQuillan is 
dubious) of a critical practice that is not transcendental in orientation. 
McQuillan’s description of transcendental critique offers a solid overview of the way in 
which Kant thought transcendental philosophy should proceed and why philosophy itself 
ought to proceed in that manner.   McQuillan agrees with me that, ‚There can be no doubt that 
Foucault rejected this approach.‛  But, he continues, ‚the reasons Koopman cites in his dis-
cussion of the philosophical shortcomings of transcendental inquiry are not sufficient< 
Koopman offers no arguments which call the legitimacy of transcendental inquiry into 
question.‛  Allow me to clarify my view so as to defend, in a more precise fashion, the claim of 
mine that I believe McQuillan is here criticizing. 
We all know the major criticisms of transcendental philosophy that have been issued 
from diverse quarters across the twentieth century (in post-structuralist thought, in the 
tradition of critical theory, in pragmatism, in naturalistic veins of analytic philosophy, and 
perhaps most notably in feminist philosophy, critical race theory, and queer theory).  To my 
mind the most forceful consideration that speaks against transcendental philosophy comes 
down to the difference between modal necessity and modal contingency.  Transcendental 
critique makes sense only where we can grasp the objects of our inquiry through the category 
of necessity.  The consideration that is most forceful to my mind is just this: there is plenty in 
our world that does not admit of necessity.  Any critique whose object of inquiry is largely 
historical is going to have a tough time making sense of its object in terms of necessity.  This, 
of course, does not amount to a refutation of transcendental critique.  I have no interest in 
attempting such a refutation.  All I aim to point out is the lack of usefulness of transcendental 
critique for objects of inquiry which are better understood as contingent compositions than 
necessary results. 
In a related context, one in which the issue concerns the possibility of a rapprochement 
amongst continental, pragmatist, and analytic philosophy, Joseph Margolis recently writes: 
 
You may claim that no one has ever demonstrated that there are no transcendental 
necessities to be had—and that is certainly true.  But the burden of proof surely rests with 
transcendentalism’s champions.  At the risk of a self-defeating paradox, the argument 
against transcendentalism must be a form of faute de mieux reasoning—always open ended 
and piecemeal, never conclusively necessary or indefeasible.  But there are no successful 
transcendental counterinstances to consult.6 
 
                                                 
6 Joseph Margolis, Pragmatism’s Advantage: American and European Philosophy at the End of the Twentieth 
Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 124. 




This, to my mind, strikes the right note.  There is little point in attempting to elaborate 
the ‚philosophical shortcomings‛ of transcendental critique (but I admit that I do not really 
know what McQuillan has in mind here as a possible example of this).  Yet there is a good 
point in pointing out that transcendental necessity is not to be found in a reasonably large 
share of our (Margolis would more strongly say ‚all of our extant‛) objects of inquiry.  
Transcendental necessity is just not going to help you make sense of the prison, or of the 
history of science, or of contemporary sexuality.  These things are just too complex for ne-
cessity to play the kind of role that a transcendental critique could illuminate.  To see well here 
we need to focus light on the contingencies in a way that historical critique can help us to do. 
What I am suggesting is that those of us working in such traditions as genealogical or 
pragmatist philosophy can proceed as we would without having to bash those of our 
interlocutors who maintain the ambitions of transcendental philosophy, even if we tend to 
think of those ambitions as having outlived their usefulness and as appearing rather quaint 
midst the massive contingency of contemporary self-consciousness.  My project is not the 
negative one of bashing transcendental philosophy.  It is the positive one of describing, defen-
ding, and deploying other forms of critical inquiry which are different from, and possibly also 
compatible with, transcendental critical inquiry.  My goal has been to show that genealogical 
critique is not a form of transcendental critique but is not for that reason incompatible with 
transcendental critique and is also not for that reason disqualified from resuming in a different 
way the Kantian project of critical philosophy. 
There are many ways of practicing critique.  One would be to proceed at times in trans-
cendental critical fashion and at other times in non-transcendental critical fashion.  This, I 
think, is one way of making sense of the obvious differentiation featured in Kant’s text, for 
instance that between the first two Critiques and the historical, political, and anthropological 
writings.  Another way of practicing critique would be to proceed in a critical fashion that is 
historical rather than transcendental in orientation without having to disparage transcendental 
critique in order to take up the project of historical critique.  This, I think, is a good way of 
making sense of Foucault’s project, given not only what Foucault himself said about his own 
relation to Kant, but also given the contours of that project itself.  A third way of practicing 
critique would be to simultaneously work toward historical critique and transcendental 
critique, which is how many would read Foucault’s efforts in The Archaeology of Knowledge 
(e.g., the concept of ‚the historical a priori‛), though I fail to find the strong transcendental 
element in the text myself.7 
I understand the majority of Foucault’s work as enacting a practice of historical inquiry 
that is critical in a robust philosophical sense without imposing upon itself obligations that 
would have to be met in order for it to qualify as transcendental philosophy.  This does not 
mean that transcendental critique is saddled with certain ‚philosophical shortcomings.‛  It 
only means that transcendental critique is not well-equipped to accomplish some of the 
purposes that historical critique is well-equipped for.  I previously urged this point in my 
reply to Thompson: "since transcendental conditions are universal in scope and necessary in 
                                                 
7 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, translated by A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1969, 1972). 
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modality (even if only with respect to a given historical a priori, as historical-transcendental 
phenomenologists would have it) they purchase their explanatory power only by divesting 
themselves of the idea of historical transformability.‛8  My claim there was not that transcen-
dental philosophy is without critical purchase, but rather that it lacks critical purchase if one is 
interested primarily in the critique of historical objects of inquiry.  This remains my claim. 
 
II. Critical Philosophy 
The foregoing discussion of transcendental critique raises another, I think more crucial, 
question.  When does historical inquiry in this vein achieve the status of critique?  What 
qualifies history as historical critique?  McQuillan appears skeptical to the very possibility, at 
least with respects to some forms of history, such as Foucauldian archaeology and genealogy.  
At this point, I would like to take a step back from the debate and consider the implicit 
historiography that I find lurking behind McQuillan’s criticisms.  The skepticism at issue 
seems to me rooted in a historiographical strategy that is severely out of keeping with any 
viable conception of how to practice the history of philosophy. 
 
II.A. Two Kants 
McQuillan expresses skepticism about whether or not any practices of historical inquiry, 
including those which can be located through Foucault’s own genealogical inquiries, can be 
deservedly described as ‚critical‛ in a ‚Kantian‛ sense.  There is no doubt, McQuillan rightly 
observes, that Foucault’s project is critical, but what is at issue, McQuillan insists, is whether 
or not it is critical in the right kind of ‚Kantian‛ way.  To develop this point, McQuillan quotes 
Foucault’s appropriative reversal of Kant in ‚What is Enlightenment?‛ and suggests that we 
should ‚take him to be announcing his departure from the Kantian tradition.‛  I find this 
puzzling.  In his writings on Kant, including the piece cited by McQuillan, Foucault 
maintained an express interest in the Kantian project of ‚critique‛ and worked to develop a 
distinction between two conceptions of critique that can be found in Kant, one of which he 
would endorse and the other of which he would leave to the side without criticizing.  Amy 
Allen convincingly captures Foucault’s double-relationship to Kant as follows: ‚Far from a 
rejection of the Kantian project, Foucault’s inversion of Kant’s notion of transcendental 
subjectivity constitutes a critique of critique itself, a continuation-through-transformation of 
                                                 
8 Koopman, ‚Response to Thompson,‛ 132.  McQuillan takes issue with my claim that Foucault’s expansion 
of archaeological history into a genealogical history (that includes archaeology within it) was undertaken at 
least in part to the vexing problem of historical change which archaeology had, as Sartre and others pointed 
out, failed to adequately address.  One sees Foucault addressing this problem already, and without success, 
in Part IV, Chapter 5 of The Archaeology of Knowledge.  My view is that genealogy would yield a more satis-
factory answer to the problem of historical change than is broached in the archaeological work.  I have 
offered a more complete argument for my interpretation of Foucault on these points in Colin Koopman, 
‚Foucault's Historiographical Expansion: Adding Genealogy to Archaeology,‛ Journal of the Philosophy of 
History 2, no. 3 (Fall 2008), 338-362. 




that project.‛9  Foucault’s critique of Kantian critique itself depends upon a distinction be-
tween two Kants that is clearly featured in Foucault’s writings on the history of the modern 
critical attitude.  Closely attending to Foucault’s discussions of Kant confirms Allen’s defense 
of Foucault as justifiably appropriating Kant in contrast to McQuillan’s insistence that Fou-
cault needs more permission from Kant than he has been given. 
Foucault’s distinction between two Kants can be found in many of his late writings, 
and most recently (in terms of publication date) in his 1983 Collège de France lecture course, 
now translated into English and published under the title The Government of Self and Others.  
These lectures open with a detailed discussion of Kant’s critical philosophy in order to set the 
stage for a meeting between modern philosophical critique and ancient philosophical parresia.  
Foucault distinguishes between a practice of critique that takes the form of an ‚analytic of 
truth‛ and another that takes the form of an ‚ontology of the present.‛  Foucault concludes 
this portion of his lecture with the following option: ‚We have to opt either for a critical 
philosophy which appears as an analytical philosophy of truth in general, or for a critical 
thought which takes the form of an ontology of ourselves, of present reality.‛10  Foucault 
clearly preferred the latter project.  What is most important in Foucault’s distinction for pre-
sent purposes is that he expressly announces his project as a ‚critical‛ project that can be 
located through ‚Kant’s text.‛  My interpretation of these passages as distinguishing two 
Kants is hardly new.  In his description of the lecture course published as an appendix to the 
volume, Frédéric Gros glosses Foucault’s meaning here in exactly the terms I am urging: ‚In 
places *in Foucault’s lectures+ there remains the opposition between two possible Kantian 
legacies: a transcendental legacy to which Foucault refused to subscribe (establishing uni-
versal rules of truth in order to avoid the misuses of a dominating reason); on the other hand, 
a ‘critical’ legacy in which he wants to situate himself (challenging the present no the basis of 
the diagnosis of ‘what we are’).‛11  The operative distinction has also been developed by Ed-
ward McGushin in his work on the late Foucault: ‚Foucault appropriates Kant’s critical 
attitude while rejecting his transcendental philosophy.‛12  Note here the appropriate historio-
graphical concept: appropriation. 
Now, McQuillan’s argument is that, ‚There is, however, nothing particularly Kantian 
about emphasizing critique.‛  I agree.  But I disagree with the implicit implication that Fou-
cault’s emphasis on critique is hardly Kantian.  McQuillan writes that ‚Foucault’s conception 
of ‘what a critique ought to be’ is one that leaves Kant behind.‛  I fail to see this.  Foucault 
expressly took his conception of critique to be Kantian in orientation insofar as it was rooted in 
                                                 
9 Amy Allen, The Politics of Our Selves: Power, Autonomy, and Gender in Contemporary Critical Theory (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 24; Allen here refers as well to Thomas McCarthy’s contribution to 
David Hoy and Thomas McCarthy, Critical Theory (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994). 
10 Michel Foucault, The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1982-1983, translated by 
Graham Burchell, edited by Frédéric Gros et. al (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 21. 
11 Frédéric Gros, ‚Course Context‛ in Foucault, The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de 
France, 1982-1983, translated by Graham Burchell, edited by Gros et. al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010), 379. 
12 Edward F. McGushin, Foucault’s Askēsis: An Introduction to the Philosophical Life (Evanston: Northwestern 
University, 2007), 246. 
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an appropriative interpretation of Kant’s texts.  Foucault’s appropriative relation to Kant’s 
texts (reusing and remixing them) is evidenced by much in his thought, including: his explicit 
references to Kant, his careful rereadings of marginalized texts by Kant, his conception of 
critique as working on the ‚limits‛ of thought, and his use of the idea of ‚conditions of 
possibility‛ throughout his philosophic career.  This, at least according to an appropriationist 
historiography, provides sufficient warrant for seeing Foucault’s philosophical contribution as 
Kantian without adhering to the letter of Kant’s philosophical contribution.  My sense is that a 
historian of philosophy would be willing to deny Foucault this label only at the pain of 
employing an extremely rigorous form of a permissionist historiography.  Allow me to turn, 
then, to the background historiographical matters that I take to be the real heart of the issue 
between McQuillan and myself. 
 
II.B. Two Historiographies 
Some historians would argue that history is all about obedience to that which the past dictates.  
Others of us hold that history ought to take a more critical relation to the past whereby we 
take primary responsibility for the freedom that ought to accompany our historical inquiries.  
McQuillan’s permissionist historiography would have us ask the past itself, in this case the 
author-figure named Immanuel Kant as represented in the texts signed by that name, for 
permission to take up its legacy.  This form of historiography can be useful, but it also bears 
obvious limits.  These limits are, above all, a function of the implicit obedience toward the past 
that such a historiography demands of us.  My appropriationist historiography, by contrast, 
would ask us to make productive use of the past on our own terms whereby we attend to and 
care for the past but without bowing to it in an obedient posture.  This form of historiography 
also has its limits in addition to its uses.  While it is limited for the purposes of historical 
reconstruction, or understanding the past in and on its own terms, it is especially useful for a 
form of historiography through which we are able to relate to our historical present with the 
intent of transforming that present.13 
In my view, the contrast between ‚permissionist‛ and ‚appropriationist‛ historio-
graphies recapitulates more general debates in modern culture between those who would 
have us be obedient toward tradition and those who would have us take up a posture of 
freedom toward ourselves.14  But that is another matter.  And I do not take this matter to be 
settled based on my quick coverage here.  All I take to be settled is a statement of what is at 
issue.  McQuillan and I seem to have quite different interests at heart when we do work in the 
history of philosophy.  Both of these interests can lead to productive work.  What I am unsure 
of is how productive it is in the long run to impose the standards of permissionist 
historiography on appropriationist historiography when it is largely by virtue of the latter that 
the history of philosophy remains relevant to the concerns of our historical present. 
                                                 
13 Cf., Richard Rorty, ‚The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres‛ in Richard Rorty et. al. (eds.), Philo-
sophy in History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). 
14 See Lessig, n.5 above, as well as Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1973). 




One way of restating the issues of influence and inheritance operative here is in terms 
of a fine distinction between Kantian philosophy and Kant’s philosophy, a distinction which I 
wish to defend but about which McQuillan appears nervous.  What McQuillan objects to is my 
claim that Foucault’s historical-philosophical practice is a practice of Kantian critique.  It is 
notable that his points are framed in terms of ‚Kantian‛ philosophy, ‚Kantian‛ critique, and 
‚the Kantian tradition‛ insofar as he seems to identify all things ‚Kantian‛ with what might be 
described as the express letter of Kant’s texts in a way can only rely on a permissionist 
historiography.  In keeping with this implicit historiographical bias, his forceful challenges to 
my view take the form of close readings of the letter of Kant’s texts.  That one may find his 
rereadings disputable on certain points is hardly at issue here, though certainly that might be 
at issue elsewhere.  For what is really at issue is whether or not we can settle the question of 
what counts as Kantian in philosophy by a careful examination of those thoughts that can be 
identified as Kant’s.  My view is that McQuillan’s discussion is of great interest, but it settles 
(and then only potentially) what was Kant’s view without settling (not even potentially) what 
is Kantian.  It is the latter that I am interested in, while perhaps it is the former that interests 
McQuillan.  We are both entitled to our interests, but allow me to say something further about 
what underwrites my own. 
My view is that we need not, and indeed we should not, attend only to the letter of a 
philosopher’s text in attempting to pick out those philosophical problematics which form by 
subtle and gradual accretion around their texts in ways that exceed the original letter of the 
philosopher’s thought.  Kant could never have controlled the problematics of Kantian philo-
sophy which would well up around his texts.  McQuillan wants to reinvest Kant’s text with 
control over itself so as to guard it against appropriations by figures such as Fichte and 
Heidegger and Foucault (all three cited in his reply).  This is not only impossible insofar as it 
assumes that interpretation is secondary rather than primary with respect to what a text is, but 
it is also unhelpful because it discourages us from seeing how thought always exceeding its 
keepers by doing its work by way of bursting outside of the contexts for which it was 
originally formulated.  Understanding what is Kantian in our philosophical inheritance, in the 
sense of what in Kant persists in that inheritance, most certainly requires attending to Kant’s 
texts, but it requires attending to much else besides.  It also requires, at the very least, atten-
ding to the thought of Kant’s contemporaries, his most important predecessors, and his most 
creative successors.  And, if we want to be genealogists rather than historians of ideas about 
such problematics, then it also requires attending to the political, social, scientific, ethical, 
economic, cultural, and other processes which condition our inheritance of Kant.  To take an 
easy example, the inheritance that is Kantian philosophy today could not have formed without 
the development of the modern academic university with its immense commentary engines 
and its rigorous requirements for professional scholarship; now that development is 
something which can hardly be said to be Kant’s even if his case is unique for the role his 
thought has played in the contingent composition of that kind of institution.  One can hardly 
be a Kant scholar these days by reading only Kant, and a Kant scholar who objected to uses of 
Kant which cannot be found in Kant’s texts would be an extremely strange kind of academic 
specimen indeed. 
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This brings me to important questions we academic historians of philosophy need to be 
more forthright in asking ourselves.  Wherein should we locate the value of our work?  What 
is worth preserving from the history of philosophy in its purity?  What is worth holding on to 
only if we can creatively appropriate it?  Why is the history of philosophy important at all?  
There are a whole host of such historiographical questions, unanswered because too often 
unasked, that demand our urgent attention.  My own attempts at answers to these questions 
take their bearings from certain insights of Foucault’s, but also others including historically-
minded analytic philosophers like Bernard Williams and pragmatist philosophers including 
John Dewey, John Herman Randall, and Richard Rorty.15  I hope to have made clear here why 
we should find a permissionist historiography quite distant from nearly everything we have 
learned about the history of thought from Foucault.  That Foucault himself practiced appro-
priationist history of philosophy is without doubt: ‚I am tired of people studying *Nietzsche+ 
only to produce the same kind of commentaries< I prefer to utilize the writers I like.  The 
only valid tribute to thought such as Nietzsche’s is precisely to use it, to deform it, to make it 
groan and protest.  And if commentators say that I am being faithful or unfaithful to Niet-
zsche, that is of absolutely no interest.‛16 
Some historians of philosophy want to keep certain ideas mined from the history of 
philosophy pure.  They want to keep Kant as he was, or Plato as he was, or Nietzsche as he 
was, or even Foucault as he was.  The thinking here is usually that such an approach helps us 
get a grip on the profundity of thought featured in the work of genius: the great dead 
philosopher is supposed to have had privileged access to something special such that our job 
is to gain entrance to the depths of that special thing as featured in their texts.  Some other 
historians worry that this strategy is likely to bury the past in its inevitable death.  They worry 
that this strategy amounts to little more than asking the dead past for permission to revive it in 
the present.  They think that it is misguided to seek the express warrant of the past to make 
use of the past in the present.  They think that we need only the permission of the present, 
which is not of course to say that we need no kind of permission whatsoever.  They think that 
the standards by which we ought to grant or deny ourselves that permission should be hung, 
above all else, on how our use of the past in the present facilitates the free work of 
transforming our selves into the future.  This is, I would suggest, a Foucauldian way of 
approaching the history of philosophy, and it is ours to appropriate and remix for our own 
purposes today. 
Colin Koopman  
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University of Oregon 
USA  
koopman@uoregon.edu 
                                                 
15 For two forthcoming articles in which I address these questions from the points of view of these other 
traditions see Colin Koopman, ‚Bernard Williams on Philosophy’s Need for History‛ forthcoming in The 
Review of Metaphysics 64, no. 1, (forthcoming Sept., 2010) and Colin Koopman, ‚Historicism in Pragmatism: 
Lessons in Historiography and Philosophy,‛ Metaphilosophy 41, no. 4, (forthcoming Oct. 2010). 
16 Michel Foucault, ‚Prison Talk‛, interview with J.-J. Brochier in Foucault, Colin Gordon (ed.), Power/Know-
ledge (New York: Pantheon, 1980), 53-4.  I thank Amy Allen for drawing my attention to this passage. 
